Thursday, September 21, 2017

Compilation of Case files

This post is a compilation of case files that artists and buskers can use to learn about how you are protected... I will also post a snippet of information as an introduction to make it easier for you to find things you need that apply to your form of busking or art.

California law concerning free speech is protected even on private property such as shopping centers.  https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/447/74

Important cases and laws concerning busking
Chase v Ocean City
https://casetext.com/case/chase-v-town-of-ocean-city/?fbclid=IwAR0FMzcMtQJiKeSpQSeaSY_r0H8Q1oQ-16kUOJE7wIFtqGX5HCWo_fGQSzM
This case covers spray paint artist Mark Chase and his lawsuit against ocean city

Reno Nv, RMC5.14: This is the municipal code for Reno, NV which discusses how art, and busking are protected expressive activities. https://www.reno.gov/home/showdocument?id=69118

http://cardozolawreview.com/amplified-speech/

Music ban unconstitutional https://thecrimereport.org/2012/12/14/2012-12-car-music-ban-struck-down/

\
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5915492581390576752&q=Hassay+v.+Mayor,+955+F.Supp.2d+505+%282013%29&hl=en&as_sdt=40000006

http://www.buskersadvocates.org/saaamplification.html

Venice Beach Boardwalk musician legal battle - US District Judge Pregerson blocks Venice boardwalk lottery permit system and amplification ban in Dowd and all vs City of Los Angles - October 21, 2010 (Dowd v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-06731 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010)

"Other courts have struck down amplified sound restrictions  less sweeping than the total ban on amplified sound on the Venice  Boardwalk. See, e.g., Deegan v. City of Ithaca, 444 F.3d 135 (2d  Cir. 2006) (holding noise regulation as applied to prohibit any  sound that could be heard 25 feet from its source in downtown  pedestrian mall was not narrowly tailored); Doe, 968 F.2d at 89  (holding regulation prohibiting operating an audio device in a manner exceeding 60 decibels at 50 feet was not narrowly tailored  as applied to Lafayette Park because "[b]y no reasonable measure  does Lafayette Park display the characteristics of a setting in  which the government may lay claim to a legitimate interest in  maintaining tranquility"); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, Miss.,  664 F.2d 502, 516 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding ban on amplified sound  in residential zones overbroad because "the ordinance extends its  total and non-discretionary prohibition to areas which have not  been shown to be incompatible with sound equipment"); Reeves v.  McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding amplified sound  ban in downtown business district was not narrowly tailored because "there is probably no more appropriate place for reasonably amplified free speech than the streets and sidewalks of a downtown business district"); Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F. Supp. 2d 940, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (Collins, J.) (granting preliminary injunction against rule banning amplified sound on community college campus except in three "preferred areas" because the defendants "failed to rebut Plaintiffs' claim that the 'preferred areas' do not meet the 'ample alternatives for communications' requirement for reasonable content-neutral, time place, and manner regulation"); Lionhart v. Foster, 100 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. La. 1999) (holding that law "regulat[ing] the production of sound in excess of 55 decibels within 10 feet of  hospitals or churches during posted services" was "unreasonably  overbroad in the context of normal activities on public streets  and in public parks").

Of course, even in a traditional public forum, reasonable  restrictions on the use of amplified sound are permitted, so long  as they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government  interest. But, because "streets, sidewalks, parks and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 u.s. 507, 515 (1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Cit:y's absolute ban on the use of amplified sound twenty-four hours per day on the Boardwalk except in a limited number of specially designated spaces simply sweeps too broadly and does not materially advance the City's proffered interest. Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that  the amplified sound ban is facially overbroad (and because, as mentioned earlier, the balance of hardships and the public interest weigh in favor of enjoining regulations that violate the First Amendment), the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for  preliminary injunction with respect to LAMC § 43.15 (F) (5)."

DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge







Dowd vs Los Angeles




https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331  oath of office law  which all police, and law enforcement swear to as all lawyers and judges and city council members, mayors, governors, congress and so on must abide by to take their office!


San diego city code prohibits the abridgement of first amendment rights!  Read this pdf for more information http://docs.sandiego.gov/memooflaw/MS-2011-16.pdf


Woman in palm springs california settles lawsuit for 30,000 with the city of palm springs over loitering laws and poetry!




This is St Louis v the Constitution.
https://vlaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Freedom-of-Speech-and-the-Street-Performer.pdf

this case concerns using profanity in public.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/
States must have a better reason than a concern for generally disturbing the peace when they ban displaying an expletive in a public space.


https://www.courier-journal.com/story/money/louisville-city-living/2019/07/31/art-lou-busker-program-downtown-louisville/1869923001/?fbclid=IwAR0-0t-XoHmSHchKbXk5Ql0W-eaKlYBXVMS988Xizi8nc-XC8d27c0NIcmA

No comments:

Post a Comment